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ABSTRACT
We study the problem of detecting vandals on Wikipedia
before any human or known vandalism detection system re-
ports flagging potential vandals so that such users can be
presented early to Wikipedia administrators. We leverage
multiple classical ML approaches, but develop 3 novel sets of
features. Our Wikipedia Vandal Behavior (WVB) approach
uses a novel set of user editing patterns as features to classify
some users as vandals. Our Wikipedia Transition Probabil-
ity Matrix (WTPM) approach uses a set of features derived
from a transition probability matrix and then reduces it via
a neural net auto-encoder to classify some users as vandals.
The VEWS approach merges the previous two approaches.
Without using any information (e.g. reverts) provided by
other users, these algorithms each have over 85% classifica-
tion accuracy. Moreover, when temporal recency is consid-
ered, accuracy goes to almost 90%. We carry out detailed
experiments on a new data set we have created consisting
of about 33K Wikipedia users (including both a black list
and a white list of editors) and containing 770K edits. We
describe specific behaviors that distinguish between vandals
and non-vandals. We show that VEWS beats ClueBot NG
and STiki, the best known algorithms today for vandalism
detection. Moreover, VEWS detects far more vandals than
ClueBot NG and on average, detects them 2.39 edits before
ClueBot NG when both detect the vandal. However, we
show that the combination of VEWS and ClueBot NG can
give a fully automated vandal early warning system with
even higher accuracy.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.2.8 [Database applications]: Data mining
Keywords
Wikipedia, vandal detection, behavior modeling, early de-
tection
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1. INTRODUCTION
With over 4.6M articles, 34M pages, 23M users, and 134K
active users, English Wikipedia is one of the world’s biggest
information sources, disseminating information on virtually
every topic on earth. Versions of Wikipedia in other lan-
guages further extend its reach. Yet, Wikipedia is compro-
mised by a relatively small number of vandals — individuals
who carry out acts of vandalism that Wikipedia defines as
“any addition, removal, or change of content, in a deliberate
attempt to compromise the integrity of Wikipedia" [1]. Van-
dalism is not limited to Wikipedia itself, but is widespread in
most social networks. Instances of vandalism have been re-
ported in Facebook (vandalism of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s
fan page in Jan 2011), WikiMapia and OpenStreetMaps [2].
There has been considerable work on identifying vandal-
ized pages in Wikipedia. For instance, ClueBot NG [3],
STiki [4], and Snuggle [5] use heuristic rules and machine
learning algorithms to flag acts of vandalism. There is also
linguistic work on finding suspicious edits by analyzing edit
content [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Most of these works use linguistic
features to detect vandalism.
Our goal in this paper is the early identification of van-
dals before any human or known vandalism detection system
reports vandalism so that they can be brought to the atten-
tion of Wikipedia administrators. This goes hand-in-hand
with human reporting of vandals. But this information is
not used in any of our three algorithms.1
This paper contains five main contributions.
1. We define a novel set of “behavioral features” that
capture edit behavior of Wikipedia users.
2. We conduct a study showing the differences in behav-
ioral features for vandals vs. benign users.
3. We propose three sets of features that use no human
or known vandal detection system’s reports of vandalism to
predict which users are vandals and which ones are benign.
These approaches use the behavioral features from above
and have over 85% accuracy. Moreover, when we do a clas-
sification using data from previous n months up to the cur-
rent month, we get almost 90% accuracy. We show that our
VEWS algorithm handily beats today’s leaders in vandalism
detection - ClueBot NG (71.4% accuracy) and STiki (74%
1Just for completeness, Section 4.3 reports on differences between
vandals and benign users when reverts are considered. Our ex-
periments actually show that using human or known vandalism
detection system generated reversion information improves the
accuracy of our approaches by only about 2%, but as our goal is
early detection, VEWS ignores reversion information.
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accuracy). Nonetheless, VEWS benefits from ClueBot NG
and STiki - combining all three gives the best predictions.
4. VEWS is very effective in early identification of van-
dals. VEWS detects far more vandals (15,203) than ClueBot
NG (12,576). On average, VEWS predicts a vandal after it
makes (on average) 2.13 edits, while ClueBot NG needs 3.78
edits. Overall, the combination of VEWS and ClueBot NG
gives a fully automated system without any human input
to detect vandals (STiki has human input, so it is not fully
automated).
5. We develop the unique UMDWikipedia data set that
consists of about 33K users, about half of whom are on a
white list, and half of whom are on a black list.
2. RELATEDWORK
To date, almost all work on Wikipedia vandals has focused
on the problem of identifying pages whose text has been
vandalized. The first attempt to solve this problem came
directly from the Wikipedia community with the develop-
ment of bots implementing simple heuristics and machine
learning algorithms to automatically detect page vandalism
(some examples are ClueBot NG [3] and STiki [4]).
The tools currently being used to detect vandalism on
Wikipedia are ClueBot NG and STiki. ClueBot NG is the
state-of-the-art bot being used in Wikipedia to fight vandal-
ism. It uses an artificial neural network to score edits and
reverts the worst-scoring edits. STiki [4] is another tool to
help trusted users to revert vandalism edits using edit meta-
data (editor’s timestamp, user info, article and comment),
user reputation score and textual features. STiki leverages
the spatio-temporal properties of edit metadata to assign
scores to each edit, and uses human or bot reverted edits of
the user to incrementally maintain a user reputation score
[7]. In our experiments, we show that our method beats
both these tools in finding vandals.
A number of approaches such as [6, 7, 8, 9, 11] (see [12]
for a survey) use feature extraction (including some linguis-
tic features) and machine learning and validate them on the
PAN-WVC-10 corpus: a set of 32K edits annotated by hu-
mans on Amazon Mechanical Turk. [8] builds a classifier by
using the features computed by WikiTrust [13] which moni-
tors edit quality, content reputation, and content-based au-
thor reputation.2 By combining all the features (NLP, rep-
utation and metadata) from [6, 8] and STiki tool [7], it is
possible to obtain a classifier with better accuracy [9].
Past efforts differ from ours in at least one of the two re-
spects: they i) predict whether an edit is vandalism, and not
whether a user is a vandal, or ii) take into account factors
that involve human input (such as number of user’s edits re-
verted). We have not used textual features at all (and there-
fore, we do not rely on algorithms/heuristics that predict
vandalism edits). However, we show that the combination of
linguistic (from ClueBot NG and STiki) and non-linguistic
features (from VEWS algorithm) gives the best classification
results. Moreover, we show that a fully automated (with-
out human input) effective vandal detection system can be
created by combining VEWS and ClueBot NG.
2WikiTrust cannot be used to detect vandals immediately, as it
requires a few edits made on the same article to judge an edit and
modify the user reputation score. WikiTrust was discontinued as
a tool to detect vandalism in 2012 due to poor accuracy and
unreliability.
Our work is closer in spirit to [14] which studies how hu-
mans navigate through Wikipedia in search of information.
They proposed an algorithm to predict the user’s intended
target page, given the click log. In contrast, we study users’
edit patterns and differentiate between users based on the
pages he/she has edited. Other studies look at users’ web
navigation and surfing behavior [15, 16] and why users re-
visit certain pages [17]. By using patterns in edit histories
and egocentric network properties, [18] proposes a method to
identify the social roles played by Wikipedia users (substan-
tive experts, technical editors, vandal fighters, and social
networkers), but don’t identify vandals.
3. THE UMDWIKIPEDIA DATASET
We now describe the UMDWikipedia dataset3 which cap-
tures various aspects of the edits made by both vandals and
benign users.4 The UMDWikipedia dataset consists of the
following components.
Black list DB. This consists of all 17,027 users that reg-
istered and were blocked by Wikipedia administrators for
vandalism between January 01, 2013 and July 31, 2014. We
refer to these users as vandals.
White list DB. This is a randomly selected list of 16,549
(benign) users who registered between January 01, 2013 and
July 31, 2014 and who are not in the black list.
Edit Meta-data DB. This database is constructed using
the Wikipedia API [19] and has the schema
(User, Page, T itle, T ime,Categories,M)
A record of the form (u, p, t, t′, C,m) says that at time
t′, user u edited the page p (which is of type m where m
is either a normal page or a meta-page5), which has title t
and has list C of Wikipedia categories attached to it.6 All
in all, we have 770,040 edits: 160,651 made by vandals and
609,389 made by benign users.
Edited article hop DB. This database specifies, for
each pair (p1, p2) of pages that a user consecutively edited,
the minimum distance in the Wikipedia hyper-link graph7
from p1 to p2. We used the code provided by [20].
Revert DB. Just for the one experiment we do at the
very end, we use the edit reversion dataset provided by
[21] which marks an edit “reverted" if it has been reverted
within next 15 edits on the page. [22] suggests that 94%
of the reverts are detected by the method used to create
the dataset. Therefore, we use this dataset as ground truth
to know whether the edit was reverted or not. Note that
this information is not needed as a feature in our algorithm
for prediction, but to analyze the property of reversion across
vandals and benign users. Observe that Revert DB also con-
tains the information whether the reversion has been made
by ClueBot NG. We use this to compare with ClueBot NG.
STiki DB. We use the STiki API [23] to collect STiki
vandalism scores, and the raw features used to derive these
3The data set is available at http://www.cs.umd.edu/~vs/vews
4We only studied users with registered user names.
5Wikipedia pages can either be normal article pages or can be
discussion or “talk” pages where users may talk to each other
and discuss edits.
6Note that Wikipedia assigns a category to each article from a
category tree — this therefore labels each page with the set of
categories to which it belongs.
7This is the graph whose vertices are pages and where there is an
edge from page p1 to p2 if p1 contains a hyper-link to p2.
Whether p2 is a meta-page or normal page.
Time difference between the two edits: less than 3 minutes (very fast edit), less than 15 minutes (fast edit),
more than 15 minutes (slow edit).
Whether or not p2 is the first page ever edited by the user.
Whether or not p2 is a page that has already been edited by the user before (p2 is a re-edit) and, if yes
- Whether or not p1 is equal to p2 (i.e. were two consecutive edits by the same user applied to the same page);
- Whether of not a previous edit of p2 by the user u has been reverted by any other Wikipedia user.
Otherwise, p2 is a page edited for the first time by user u. In this case, we include the following data:
- the minimum number of links from p1 and p2 in the Wikipedia hyper-link graph: more than 3 hops, at most 3 hops,
or not reachable;
- the number of categories p1 and p2 have in common: none, at least one, or null if category information is not available.
Table 1: Features used in the edit_pair and user_log datasets to describe a consecutive edit (p1, p2) made by user u.
scores (including the user reputation score). We use vandal-
ism and user scores only to compare with STiki.
Edit Pair and User Log Datasets.
To analyze the properties of edits made by vandals and
benign users, we create two additional datasets using the
data in the UMDWikipedia dataset.
Edit Pair Dataset. The edit_pair dataset contains a
row for each edit (u, p1, p2, t), where u is a user id, (p1, p2)
is a pair of Wikipedia pages that are consecutively edited by
user u, and t is the time stamp of the edit made on p2. Note
that p1 and p2 could be the same if the user makes two edits,
one after another, on the same page. Each row contains the
values of the features shown in Table 1 computed for the
edit (u, p1, p2, t). These features describe the properties of
page p2 with respect to page p1.
User Log Dataset. The chronological sequence of each
consecutive pair (p1, p2) of pages edited by the same user u
corresponds to a row in this dataset. Each pair (p1, p2) is
described by using the features from Table 1. This dataset is
derived from the edit_pair dataset. It captures a host of tem-
poral information about each user, suggesting how he/she
navigated through Wikipedia and the speed with which this
was done.
4. VANDALVS. BENIGNUSERBEHAVIORS
In this section, we statistically analyze editing behaviors
of vandals and benign users in order to identify behavioral
similarities and differences.
Figure 1 shows the distributions of different properties
that are observed in the edit_pair dataset. Figures 1a- 1c
show the percentage of users on the y-axis as we vary the
number of edits, number of distinct pages edited and the
percentage of re-edits on the x-axis. These three graphs
show near identical behavior.
Figures 1d- 1f show the percentage of edit pairs (u, p1, p2)
on the y-axis as we vary time between edits, number of com-
mon categories between edited pages p1 and p2 and number
of hops between p1 and p2. The behavior of users in terms
of time taken between edits is nearly identical. The last two
graphs show somewhat different behaviors between vandals
and benign users. Figure 1e shows that the percentage of
edit pairs involving just one, two, or three common cate-
gories is 2-3 times higher for benign users than for vandals.
Likewise, figure 1f shows that for benign users, the percent-
age of edit pairs involving exactly one hop is 1.5 times that
of vandals, but the percentage of edit pairs involving 3-4
hops is much higher for vandals than for benign users.
In all the histograms in Figure 1, the null hypothesis that
the distribution for vandals and benign users have identical
average has p-value > 0.05. As this fails to say that their
behavior is not similar, we do a more in-depth analysis to
distinguish between them. So, we perform a frequent itemset
mining step on the edit_pair and user_log datasets. Figure 2
summarizes the results.
4.1 Similarities between Vandal and Benign
User Behavior (w/o reversion features)
Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c show similarities between vandal
and benign user behaviors.
• Both vandals and benign users are much more likely to
re-edit a page compared to editing a new page. We see from
Figure 2a that for vandals, the likelihood of a re-edit is 61.4%
compared to a new edit (38.6%). Likewise, for benign users,
the likelihood of a re-edit is 69.71% compared to a new edit
(30.3%).
• Both vandals and benign users consecutively edit the
same page quickly. The two rightmost bars in Figure 2a
show that both vandals and benign users edit the same page
fast. 77% of such edit pairs (for vandals) occur within 15
minutes – this number is 66.4% for benign users. In fact,
over 50% of these edits occur within 3 minutes for vandals -
the corresponding number for benign users is just over 40%.
•Both vandals and benign users exhibit similar navigation
patterns. 29% of successively edited pages (for both van-
dals and benign users) are by following links only (no com-
mon category and reachable by hyperlinks), about 5% due
to commonality in categories only between the successively
edited pages (at least one common category and not reach-
able by hyperlinks), and 20-25% with commonality in both
properties and linked. This is shown in Figure 2b.
• In their first few edits, both vandals and benign users
have similar editing behavior : Figure 2c shows just the first
4 edits made by both vandals and benign users. We see
here that the percentage of re-edits and consecutive edits
are almost the same in both cases.
4.2 Differences between Vandals and Benign
User Behavior (w/o reversion features)
We also identify several behaviors which differentiate be-
tween vandals and benign users.
• Vandals make faster edits than benign users. On aver-
age, vandals make 35% of their edits within 15 minutes of
the previous edit while benign users make 29.79% of their
edits within 15 minutes (Figure 2d). This difference is sta-
tistically significant with a p-value of 8.2× 10−82.
•Benign users spend more time editing a new (to them)
page than vandals. Vandals make 70% of their edits to a page
they have not edited before within 15 minutes of their last
edit, while for benign users the number is 54.3% (Figure 2d).
This may be because a benign user must absorb the content
of a new page before making thoughtful edits, while a vandal
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 1: Plots showing the distribution of different properties for UMDWikipedia and edit_pair datasets.
knows what he wants to say in advance and just goes ahead
and says it.
• The probability that benign users edit a meta-page is
much higher than the same probability in the case of vandals.
Figure 2e shows that even in their very first edit, benign
users have a 64.77% chance of editing a meta-page, while this
is just 10.34% for vandals. If we look at the first 4 edits, the
percentage of edits that are on meta-pages is 62% for benign
users and just 11.1% for vandals. And if we look at all the
edits, 40.72% of edits by normal users are on meta-pages,
while only 21.57% of edits by vandals are on meta-pages.
4.3 Differences between Vandals and Benign
User Behavior (including reversion)
For the sake of completeness, we also analyze the data
looking for differences between vandal and benign user be-
havior when reverts are considered — however these differ-
ences are not considered in our vandal prediction methods.
• Vandals make more edits driven by reversion than benign
users. Whenever a vandal u re-edits a page p, in 34.36% of
the cases, u’s previous edit on p was reverted by others.
This almost never occurs in the case of benign users — the
probability is just 4.8%. This suggests that benign users are
much more accepting of reversions than vandals.
•The probability that a re-edit by a benign user of a page
is accepted, even if previous edits by him on the same page
were reverted, is much higher than for vandals. Consider the
case when a user edits a page p after some of his prior edits
on p were reverted by other. If the user u is a benign user,
it is more likely that his last edit is accepted. This suggests
that the sequence of edits made by u were collaboratively
edited by others with the last one surviving, suggesting that
u’s reverts were constructive and were part of a genuine
collaboration. Among the cases when u re-edits a page after
one of his previous edits on p has been reverted, 89.87% of
these re-edits survive for benign users, while this number is
only 32.2% for vandals.
• Vandals involve themselves in edit wars much more fre-
quently than benign users. A user u is said to participate
in an edit war if there is a consecutive sequence of edits by
u on the same page which is reverted at least two or three
times (we consider both cases). Figure 2f shows that 27.9%
of vandals make two pairs of consecutive edits because their
previous edit was reverted, but only 13.41% of benign users
do so. 12% of vandals make three such pairs of consecutive
edits, compared to 2.9% in the case of benign users.
• The probability that benign users discuss their edits is
much higher than the probability of vandals doing so. In
31.3% of the cases when a benign user consecutively edits
a page p twice (i.e. the user is actively editing a page),
he then edits a meta page. With vandals, this probability
is 11.63%. This suggests that benign editors discuss edits
on a meta-page after an edit, but vandals do not (perhaps
because doing so would draw attention to the vandalism). In
addition there is a 24.41% probability that benign users will
re-edit a normal Wikipedia page after editing a meta-page
while this happens much less frequently for vandals (only
6.17% vandals do such edits). This indicates that benign
users, after discussing relevant issues on meta pages, edit a
normal Wikipedia page.
• Benign users consecutively surface edit pages a lot. We
define a surface edit by a user u on page p as: i) a consecu-
tively edit on the same page p twice by u, and ii) the edit is
not triggered by u’s previous edit on p being reverted, and
iii) made within 3 minutes of the previous edit by u. 50.94%
benign users make at least one surface edit on a meta page,
while only 8.54% vandals do so. On normal pages, both be-
nign and normal users make such edits - there are 37.94%
(a) Type of edit and time data overall edits (∆t_c
is the elapsed time between edits on the same page).
(b) For a consecutive edit (p1, p2), how users surf
from p1 to the edit of a new page p2.
(c) First 4 edits in users log. (d) Edit time.
(e) Meta-pages editing. (f) Edit war (involves reversion).
Figure 2: Analogies and differences between benign users and vandals.
such cases for benign users and 36.94% for vandals. Over all
pages, 24.24% benign users make at least 3 consecutive sur-
face edits not driven by reversion, but only 7.82% vandals
do so.
In conclusion: (i) Vandals make edits at a faster rate than
benign users. (ii) Vandals are much less engaged in edits of
meta pages, i.e. they are less involved in discussions with
the community.
5. VANDAL PREDICTION
In the following sections, we use the insights from the pre-
vious section to classify vandals and benign users. Our van-
dal prediction methods use multiple known classifiers (SVM,
decision trees, random forest and k-nearest neighbors) with
different sets of features. In the accuracies reported in this
section, the results are computed with SVM, as it gives the
highest accuracy as reported in Section 6 using a 10-fold
cross validation. All features used for vandal prediction are
behavior based and include no human generated revert infor-
mation whatsoever. Thus, these approaches form an early
warning system for Wikipedia administrators.
5.1 Wikipedia Vandal Behavior (WVB) Approach
WVB uses features derived from consecutive edits. These
are found by frequent pattern mining of the user_log dataset.
Specifically, we extract the frequent patterns on both benign
and vandal user logs – then, for each frequent pattern of be-
nign users, we compute the frequency of the same pattern for
vandals and vice versa. Finally, we select the patterns hav-
ing significant frequency difference between the two classes.
The resulting features are described below:
1. Consecutive re-edit, slowly (crs): whether or not
the user edited the same page consecutively with a time gap
exceeding 15 minutes.
2. Consecutive re-edit, very fast (crv): whether or
not the user edited the same page consecutively and less
than 3 minutes passed between the two edits.
3. Consecutive re-edit of a meta-page (crm): the
number of times the user re-edited the same meta-page, con-
secutively.
4. Consecutive re-edit of a non-meta-page (crn):
whether or not the user re-edited the same non-meta-page,
consecutively.
5. Consecutive re-edit of a meta-page, very fast
(crmv): whether or not the user re-edited the same meta-
page, consecutively, and less than 3 minutes passed between
the two edits.
6. Consecutive re-edit of a meta-page, fast (crmf):
whether or not the user re-edited the same meta-page, con-
secutively, and 3 to 15 minutes passed between the two edits.
7. Consecutive re-edit of a meta-page, slowly (crms):
whether or not the user re-edited the same meta-page, con-
secutively, and more than 15 minutes passed between the
two edits.
8. Consecutively re-edit fast and consecutively re-
edit very fast (crf_crv): whether or not the following
pattern is observed in the user log - the user re-edited the
same article within 15 minutes, and later re-edited a (possi-
bly different) article and less than 3 minutes passed between
the second pair of edits.
9. First edit meta-page (fm): whether or not the
first edit of the user was on a meta-page. This in itself is
quite a distinguishing feature, because usually vandals first
edit a non-meta page and benign users first edit a meta-
page. Therefore, this becomes quite an important feature
for distinguishing the two.
10. Edit of a new page at distance at most 3 hops,
slowly (ntus): whether or not the user edited a new page
(never edited by him before) p2 which is within 3 hops or
less of the previous page p1 that he edited and either p1 or
p2’s category is unknown8 and the time gap between the two
edits exceeds 15 minutes.
11. Edit of a new page at distance at most 3 hops
slowly and twice (nts_nts): whether or not there are two
occurrences of the following feature in the user log: Edit of
a new page at distance at most 3 hops, slowly (nts), i.e. in
a pair (p1, p2) of consecutive edits, whether or not the user
edited a new page p2 (i.e. never edited before) such that p2
can be reached from p1 link-wise with at most 3 hops, and
more than 15 minutes passed between the edit of p1 and p2.
In predicting vandals, we do not use any feature involv-
ing human identification of vandals (e.g. number of edits
and reversion) because number of edits made has a bias to-
wards benign users as they tend to perform more edits, while
vandals perform fewer edits because they get blocked. Any
feature that has a negative human intervention (number of
reversions, number of warnings given to the user on a talk
page, etc.) already indicates human recognition that a user
may be a vandal. We explicitly avoid such features so that
we provide Wikipedia administrators with a fully automated
vandal early warning system.
Feature importance: We compute the importance of the
features described above by using the fact that the depth of
a feature used as a decision node in a tree captures the rel-
ative importance of that feature w.r.t. the target variable.
Features at the top of the tree contribute to the final pre-
diction decision of a larger fraction of inputs. The expected
fraction of samples they contribute to can be used to esti-
mate their importance. Figure 3 shows the importance of
the different features for the classification task, which was
computed by using a forest of 250 randomized decision trees
(extra-trees [24]). The red bars in the plot show the fea-
ture importance using the whole forest, with their variabil-
8This happens mostly for meta-pages though it can occasionally
also happen for normal (non-meta) pages.
Figure 3: Importance of features (w/o reversion).
Figure 4: Percentage of vandals and benign users with particular
features (w/o reversion).
ity across the trees represented by the blue bars. From the
figure, it is clear that the features - fm, ntus and crmv - are
the three most descriptive features for the classes. These are
shown in greater detail in Figure 4. Let us look into each of
them one by one.
• If the very first page edited by user u is a normal (non-
meta) page, then u is much more likely to be a vandal (64.77%)
than a benign user (10.34%). The fm feature tells us that
when a user’s first edit is on a normal page, the user is much
more likely to be a vandal.
• Benign users are likely to take longer to edit a new page
than a vandal (ntus). The probability that a benign user
takes more than 15 minutes to edit the next page in an
edit pair (p1, p2) when p2 is within 3 hops of p1, and p1 or
p2’s category is unknown is much higher (54.82%) than for
vandals (7.66%). This suggests that benign users take longer
to edit pages than vandals, possibly because they are careful
and anxious to do a good job. Moreover, as p1 or p2 have
no categories, the page is more likely to be a meta-page.
• Benign users are much more likely to re-edit the same
meta-page quickly (within 3 minutes) than vandals. This
usually happens when there is a minor mistake on the page,
and the user edits to correct it. Note that this again has
the feature that the edit was made on a meta page. Benign
users are much more likely to make such edits (53.13%) than
vandals (9.88%).
The top three features indicate that editing meta versus
normal Wikipedia pages is a strong indicator of whether
the user is benign. Intuitively, vandals vandalize heavily
accessed pages and so normal pages are their most common
target. On the other hand, benign users interact and discuss
issues with other users about the content of the edit, and
this discussion is done on meta pages.
Accuracy: Using an SVM classifier, the WVB approach
obtains an accuracy of 86.6% in classifying Wikipedia users
as vandals or benign on our entire user_log dataset.
5.2 Wikipedia Transition Probability Matrix
(WTPM) Approach
The Wikipedia Transition Probability Matrix (WTPM)
captures the edit summary of the users. The states in WTPM
correspond to the space of possible vectors of features asso-
ciated with any edit pair (p1, p2) carried out by a user u.
By looking at Table 1, we see that there are 2 options for
whether p2 is a meta-page or not, 3 options for the time dif-
ference between edits (p1, p2), and so forth. This gives us a
total of 60 possible states. Example states include: consecu-
tively re-edit a normal-page within 15 minutes (s1), or edit a
new normal page p2 within 3 hops from p1 and no common
categories within 3 minutes (s2), etc.
The transition matrix T (u) of user u captures the prob-
ability Tij(u) that user u goes from state si to sj . Tij =
N(si,sj)∑
k
N(si,sk)
, where N(si, sj) is the number of times the user
went from state si to sj . This gives a (usually sparse) tran-
sition matrix of size 60 × 60 = 3600.
The intuition behind using WTPM as features for clas-
sification is that the transition probability from one state
to the other for a vandal may differ from that of a benign
user. Moreover, the states visited by vandals may be dif-
ferent from states visited by benign users (for example, it
turns out that benign users are more likely to visit a state
corresponding to “first edit on meta page", than vandals do).
We create a compact and distributed representation of
T (u) using an auto-encoder[25] — this representation pro-
vides the features for our SVM classifier. When doing cross-
validation, we train the auto-encoder using the training set
with input from both benign users and vandals. We then
take the value given by the hidden layer for each input as
the feature for training a classifier. For predicting output for
the test set, we give each test instance as input to the auto-
encoder and feed its representation from the hidden layer
into the classifier. Note that the auto-encoder is trained
only on the training set, and the representation for the test
set is derived only from this learned model.
Accuracy: With a neural net auto-encoder of 400 hidden
units and with SVM as the classifier, the WTPM approach
gives an accuracy of 87.39% on the entire dataset.
5.3 VEWS Algorithm
The VEWS approach merges all the features used by both
the WVB approach and theWTPM approach. The resulting
accuracy with a SVM classifier slightly improves the accu-
racy of classification to 87.82%.
6. VANDAL PREDICTION EXPERIMENTS
We used the popularly used machine learning library called
Scikit-learn [26] for our experiments and the deep learning
library Theano [27] for training the auto-encoder.
Experiment 1: Overall Classification Accuracy. Ta-
ble 2 shows the overall classification accuracy of all three ap-
proaches by doing a 10-fold cross validation using an SVM
classifier, together with the true positive, true negative, false
positive, and false negative rates. We see that TP and TN
rates are uniformly high, and FP and FN rates are low,
making SVM an excellent classifier.
Accuracy TPR TNR FPR FNR
WVB 86.6% 0.85 0.89 0.11 0.15
WTPM 87.39% 0.88 0.90 0.10 0.12
VEWS 87.82% 0.87 0.92 0.08 0.13
Table 2: Table showing the accuracy and statistical values de-
rived from the confusion matrix for the three approaches, on the
entire dataset and averaged over 10 folds (without reversion fea-
tures). The positive and negative class represent benign and van-
dal users, respectively.
We use McNemar’s paired test to check whether the three
approaches produce different results. For all pairs among
the three approaches, the null hypothesis that they produce
the same results is rejected with p-value < 0.01, showing
statistical significance. Overall, VEWS produces the best
result even though it has slightly lower true positives and
slightly more false negatives than WTPM.
We also classified using the VEWS approach with deci-
sion tree classifier, random forest classifier (with 10 trees)
and k-nearest neighbors classifier (with k = 3) which gave
classification accuracy of 82.82%, 86.62% and 85.4% respec-
tively. We experimented with other classifiers as well, but
they gave lower accuracy.
Experiment 2: Improvement with Temporal Re-
cency. The previous experiment’s cross validation randomly
selects samples from the entire dataset for training and val-
idation. But in the real world, a vandal’s behavior may be
more closely related to other vandals’ recent behavior. To
check this, starting from April 2013, for each month m, we
train our algorithms with data from all the users who started
editing on Wikipedia within the previous three months, i.e.
in months m − 3,m − 2 and m − 1. m is varied until July
2014. We then use the learned model to predict whether a
user is vandal or benign among the users who made their
first edit in month m. The variation of accuracy is shown in
Figure 5. The highest accuracy of 91.66% is obtained with
the VEWS approach, when predicting for users who started
editing in January 2014 and training is done with users from
October-December 2013. The average accuracy for the three
approaches over all the time points is also shown in Figure 5.
The most important observation from Figure 5 is that
temporal classification accuracy for each approach is usually
higher than the base accuracy shown in Table 2 and Figure 7
(described later in Experiment 4). We attribute this to the
fact that in the previous experiment, we use cross-validation
without considering temporal information when creating the
folds. This experiment, on the other hand, predicts vandals
based on what is learned during the previous three months.
Figure 5 shows that the approaches are consistent over
time in separating vandals from benign users. At all times,
the approaches have at least 85% classification accuracy,
with the exception of the case when using WVB during
months May and June, 2013.
Experiment 3: Varying Size of Training Set on
Classification Accuracy. We designed an experiment to
study the affect of varying the size of the training set, while
maintaining the temporal aspect intact. So for testing on
users who made their first edit in the month of July 2014,
we train the classifier on edits made by users who started
editing in the previous n months. We vary n from 1 to 12.
This preserves the temporal aspect in training, similar to the
previous experiment. The variation of accuracy is shown in
Figure 6. There are two interesting observations: i) the
Figure 5: Plot showing variation of accuracy when training on
edit log of users who started editing within previous 3 months
(without reversion features). The table reports the average accu-
racy of all three approaches.
accuracy of WTPM and VEWS increases with the number
of (training) months n. ii) In contrast, WVB’s accuracy is
hardly affected by the number of months of training data.
This is because: (i) features in WVB are binary and (ii) fm,
which is the most important feature in WVB, does not vary
with time.
Experiments 2 and 3 show strong temporal dependency
of user behavior on prediction of vandals. This may be due
to several factors: Wikipedia may change rules and policies
that affect user behavior, real world events might trigger
users to make similar edits and emulate similar behaviour,
etc. Such behavior traits would be highlighted when observ-
ing recent edits made by newly active users.
Experiment 4: Effect of First k User Edits. We
study the effect of the first-k edits made by the user on
prediction accuracy which is averaged over 10 folds of the
whole dataset. The solid lines in Figure 7 show the variation
in accuracy when k is varied from 1 to 500. As there is little
shift in classification accuracy when k > 20, the situation for
k = 1, . . . , 20 is highlighted. We get an average accuracy of
86.6% for WVB, 87.39% for WTPM, and 87.82% for VEWS
when k = 500. It is clear that the first edit itself (was the
first edit made on a meta-page or not?) is a very strong
classifier, with an accuracy of 77.4%. Accuracy increases
fast when k is increased to 10 for all approaches, after which
it flattens out. This suggests that a user’s first few edits are
very significant in deciding whether he/she is vandal or not.
Considering reversion. Figure 7 also shows that accuracy
does go up by about 2% when we allow our three algorithms
to consider reversion information. Please note that this ex-
periment is merely for completeness sake and our proposed
algorithm does not depend on reversion at all. For this ex-
periment, we added additional reversion-driven edit features
to the features used by WVB, WTPM, and VEWS (and
we called these approaches WVB-WR, WTPM-WR, and
VEWS-WR, respectively). These features capture whether
a user edited a page after his previous edit on that page
was reverted. Specifically, we extend the features - crs, crv,
crm, crn, crmv, crmf, crms and crf_crv - to now have two
types of re-edits: one that is reversion driven and one that is
not. Using reversion information would mean that a human
or vandalism detection system has already flagged a poten-
tial vandal. In contrast, our algorithms are able to predict
vandals with high accuracy even without such input.
Figure 6: Plot showing the change in accuracy by varying the
training set of users who started editing Wikipedia at most n
months before July 2014. The testing is done on users who started
editing in July 2014.
Figure 7: Plot showing variation of accuracy with the number of
first k edits. The outer plot focuses on the variation of k from 1
to 20. The inset plot shows variation of k from 1 to 500.
Comparison with State-of-the-art tools. Here we
evaluate our work against ClueBot NG [3] and STiki [4] as
they are the primary tools currently used by Wikipedia to
detect vandalism. We recall that these tools are designed to
detect whether the content of an article has been vandalized
or not, while we focus on detecting whether a user is a vandal
or not. We show that VEWS handily beats both ClueBot NG
and Stiki in the latter task. Interestingly, when we combine
VEWS’, ClueBot NG’s and STiki’s features, we get better
accuracy than with either of them alone. All experiments are
done using 10-fold cross validation and SVM as the classifier.
Comparison with ClueBot NG.Given an edit, ClueBot NG
[3] detects and reverts vandalism automatically. We could
use ClueBot NG to classify a user as a vandal if he has
made at least v vandalism edits (edits that were reverted by
ClueBot NG). For comparing this heuristic with VEWS we
use v = 1, 2, 3. Figure 8 shows that the maximum accuracy
achieved by ClueBot NG is 71.4% (when v = 1) and accuracy
decreases as v increases. Therefore, VEWS outperforms this
use of ClueBot NG.
When does VEWS Detect Vandals? Of 17,027 vandals in
our dataset, VEWS detects 3,746 that ClueBot NG does not
detect (i.e. where ClueBot NG does not revert any edits
by this person). In addition, it detects 7,795 vandals before
ClueBot NG – on average 2.6 edits before ClueBot NG did.
Figure 8: Plot showing the variation of accuracy for vandal de-
tection by considering reversions made by ClueBot NG.
Figure 9: Plot showing the variation of accuracy for vandal de-
tection by considering kth REP_USER score given by STiki.
In 210 cases, ClueBot NG detects a vandal edit 5.29 edits
earlier (on average) than VEWS detects the vandal and there
are 1,119 vandals that ClueBot NG detects but VEWS does
not. Overall, when both detect the vandal, VEWS does it
2.39 edits (on average) before ClueBot NG does.
Instead of reverts made by ClueBot NG, when we con-
sider reverts made by any human or any known vandalism
detection system, VEWS detects the vandal at least as early
as its first reversion in 87.36% cases — in 43.68% of cases,
VEWS detects the vandal 2.03 edits before the first rever-
sion. Thus, on aggregate, VEWS outperforms both humans
and other vandalism detection system in early detection of
vandals, though there are definitely a small number of cases
(7.8%) on which ClueBot NG performs very well.9
Comparison with STiki. STiki provides a “probability of
vandalism” score to each edit. STiki also maintains a user
reputation score, which is developed by looking at the user’s
past edits (the higher the score, the higher the probability
that the user is a vandal). We use both these scores sepa-
rately to compare against STiki.
We first consider a user to be a vandal if his STiki repu-
tation score (REP_USER) after making the kth edit is at
least t. Figure 9 shows the results of this experiment where
we vary t from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.1. We also report the
VEWS curve for comparison. We see that the STiki user rep-
utation score to detect vandals has less than 60% accuracy
and is handily beaten by VEWS. We do not test for values
of t greater than 1 as accuracy decreases as t increases.
9We do not compare with STiki in this experiment, as it does not
automatically revert edits.
Figure 10: Plot showing the variation of accuracy for vandal
detection by considering article scores given by STiki. RULE: If
the user makes 1 edit in first k that gets score > t, then the user
is a vandal.
In the second experiment, we say that a user is a vandal
after making k edits if the maximum STiki score among
these k edits is more than a threshold t.10 We vary the values
of t from 0 to 1 and the results can be seen in Figure 10. We
also did experiments for the case when we classify a user as
a vandal if the maximum two and three scores are above t,
which yielded lower accuracy scores.
Combining VEWS, Cluebot NG and STiki. VEWS can
be improved by adding linguistic and meta-data features
from ClueBot NG and STiki. In addition to the features
in VEWS, we add the following features: i) number of edits
reverted11 by ClueBot NG until the kth edit, ii) user repu-
tation score by STiki after the kth edit, and iii) maximum
article edit score given by STiki until the kth edit (we also
did experiments with the average article edit score instead
of maximum, which gave similar results). Figure 11 shows
the variation of average accuracy by using the first-k edits
made by the user to identify it as a vandal. The accuracy of
the VEWS-ClueBot combination is 88.6% (k = 20), which
is higher than either of them alone. Observe that this com-
bination does not consider any human input. The accuracy
of the combination VEWS-ClueBot-STiki improves slightly
to 90.8% (k = 20), but STiki considers human inputs while
calculating its scores.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we develop a theory based on edit-pairs and
edit-patterns to study the behavior of vandals on Wikipedia
and distinguish these behaviors from those of benign users.
We make the following contributions.
1. First, we develop the UMDWikipedia dataset which
contains a host of information about Wikipedia users and
their behaviors.
2. Second, we conduct a detailed analysis of behaviors
that distinguish vandals from benign users. Notable dis-
tinctions that do not involve revert information include:
(a) We find that the first page edited by vandals is much
more likely to be a normal page – in contrast, benign users’
first edits are much more likely to occur on meta-pages.
10We also tested using average instead of maximum with similar
results.
11We allow these reverts to be considered as they are generated
with no human input, so the resulting combination is still fully
automated.
Figure 11: Figure showing effect of adding STiki and ClueBot
NG’s features to our VEWS features.
(b) We find that benign users take longer to edit a page
than a vandal user.
(c) We find that benign users are much more likely to re-
edit the same page quickly (within 3 minutes) as compared
to vandals, possibly because they wanted to go back and
improve or fix something they previously wrote.
These are just three major factors that allow us to differ-
entiate between vandals and benign users. Many others are
detailed in the paper providing some of the first behavioral
insights that do not depend on reverts that differentiate be-
tween vandals and benign users.
3. We develop three approaches to predict which users are
vandals. Each of these approaches uses SVM with different
sets of features. Our VEWS algorithm provides the best
performance, achieving 87.82% accuracy. If in addition we
consider temporal factors, namely that vandals next month
are more likely to behave like vandals in the last few months,
this accuracy goes up to 89.5%. Moreover, we show that
the combination of VEWS and past work (ClueBot NG and
STiki) increases accuracy to 90.8%, even without any human
generated reversion information. Moreover, VEWS detects
far more vandals than ClueBot NG. When both VEWS and
ClueBot NG predict vandals, VEWS does it 2.39 edits (on
average) before ClueBot NG does.
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